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Producing TV Content in a Globalized Intellectual Property Market: 
The Emergence of the International Production Model 
 
Abstract 
This article focuses on the production of transnational TV formats, and argues that 
a new business model has emerged over recent decades. Whilst many formats are 
still sold and produced under licence by a third party, leading TV production 
companies prefer to adapt their own shows in as many markets as possible, a 
strategy that has led to their internationalization. This article traces back the 
model’s origins and shows how it was pioneered by game-show producers, and 
adopted by British independent TV   production companies and a few European 
broadcasters, then eventually by several Hollywood studios. This led to the 
formation of today’s 14 international TV production super-groups. This paper 
then argues that this model emerged in response to the globalization of the 
intellectual property market that was created by the TV format revolution. It was 
this revolution that spawned a market for intangibles such as programming 
concepts and production expertise, which today cross borders as much as finished 
programmes. This paper shows how the market has expanded a TV format’s value 
chain, and how TV production companies have needed to develop their 
international capabilities in order to retain control of the chain. An international 
production network enables them to generate, exploit and protect intellectual 
property on a global scale. 
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Producing TV Content in a Globalized Intellectual Property Market: 
The Emergence of the International Production Model 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
International trade flows in the television industry have changed considerably 
over the past decade. The bulk of this trade once consisted of finished 
programmes (i.e. ready-made TV shows) produced in one country and then sold 
across the world. Much of this content was made in Hollywood, but also included 
European animation, drama and documentaries. Although this type of 
programming remains, today it is complemented by international shows and 
concepts that have been adapted locally. This new development has led to the 
emergence of transnational formats covering the whole spectrum of scripted and 
unscripted entertainment, from game shows to talent competitions and from 
observational reality programmes to scripted series like The Office, Ugly Betty or 
Prisoners of War/Homeland (Chalaby, 2011; Esser, 2010; Moran, 1998, 2006). 
Each year, around the globe hundreds of formats are created, traded and produced, 
involving hundreds of broadcasters and TV production companies. From its 
humble origins in the 1950s the TV format industry has become a €3.1 billion-a-
year global business that comes with protective trade bodies (FRAPA) and glitzy 
awards ceremonies in Cannes (FRAPA, 2009: 7-8, 11). 
This article focuses on format production and argues that a new business 
model emerged in the 1990s. In the early days, format owners (or rights holders) 
would simply sell a show’s licence to a local production company or broadcaster 
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who would then adapt and produce the show for a local audience. Many formats 
are still produced under licence, but over the past 10 years or so the leading 
players have increasingly favoured a new production model: wherever possible, 
rights holders prefer to adapt and produce their shows themselves in as many 
markets as possible, a strategy that has in turn led to the international expansion of 
TV production companies. 
This article begins with a historical overview of the model, tracing back its 
origins and exploring its development in recent years. It shows how it was 
pioneered by game-show producers, and adopted by British independent 
production companies and a few European broadcasters, then eventually by 
several Hollywood studios. This led to the formation of today’s 14 international 
TV production super-groups. 
The second part argues that the TV production companies have had to adapt 
to the globalization of the intellectual property (IP) market created by the format 
revolution. This revolution opened up a market for intangibles such as 
programming concepts and production guidelines, which today cross borders as 
much as finished programmes. The IP market is global in scope since a format can 
travel anywhere in the world and, conversely, must compete with the world’s best 
formats when a broadcaster opens up a slot. This article shows how the new 
market has expanded the value chain of a piece of IP, and how production 
companies have had to adapt their business strategy accordingly. It analyses the 
advantages and risks associated with the international TV production model in 
terms of IP generation, exploitation and protection, and the formation of global 
TV franchises. 
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ORIGINS: FROM GRUNDY TO ENDEMOL AND PEARSON TV 
The international TV production model was pioneered by one of the few 
companies trading formats before the 1990s: Reg Grundy. Grundy began to adapt 
US game shows for the Australian market in the late 1950s and branched out into 
new territories about two decades later, notably, when he obtained the 
representation of the Goodson-Todman catalogue outside Europe and the Middle 
East (Chalaby, 2012: 43-4). Grundy Worldwide was the first company to set up an 
international network of subsidiaries, registering its first overseas company in the 
USA in 1979, followed by New Zealand, the UK and the Netherlands in the 
second half of the 1980s (Moran, 1998: 47-58). It expanded further in the early 
1990s, with the opening of regional offices catering for the Mediterranean area, 
Latin America and Asia in Monaco, Santiago and Singapore respectively (ibid: 
63-9).  
Grundy emerged in the mid-1990s with a ‘network of owned and operated 
companies in 17 countries tak[ing] an active hand in the production process’ 
(Fuller, 1994a). It specialized in high-volume genres, and key properties included 
game shows such as Hot Streak, Going for Gold, Man O Man, and Sale of the 
Century, and two Australian soaps, The Restless Years and Sons and Daughters. 
All were adapted in various markets across the world and more often than not, 
Grundy managed to produce or co-produce these shows.  
At the time, the only other TV production company to adopt this model was 
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Endemol. Two Dutch TV producers, Joop van den Ende and John de Mol, had 
merged their companies in January 1994 to become the world’s largest 
independent production company, worth an estimated $225 million (Smith and 
Life, 1993). Although the former was far more involved than the latter in the 
international format trade, they combined their international operations and 
Endemol started life with subsidiaries in Germany, Luxembourg and Portugal 
(Bell, 1994; Carter, interview 2008). By the time Big Brother launched at the end 
of the decade, Endemol owned or partially owned TV production companies in 
ten territories, notably Spain, Belgium, South Africa, Poland, Scandinavia, and the 
UK (Endemol, 2007: 8; see also Arris and Bughin, 2009: 104-111). From the 
outset, Endemol realised that growth required more than just licensing formats, as 
illustrated by Monica Galer, head of international: 
 
Of course we are interested in taking our formats abroad but that can be in a 
variety of different ways – producing directly for broadcasters, co-producing 
with broadcasters, or co-producing with broadcasters and other local 
producers – whatever the deal demands. (in Fuller, 1994a) 
 
It is also in the mid-1990s that Pearson replaced Grundy. In 1993, Pearson, 
owners of the Financial Times, began diversifying into television production with 
the purchase of Thames Television, the UK’s largest independent producer. Then, 
Greg Dyke, head of Pearson’s TV division, swooped on Grundy, which he bought 
for £175 million in May 1995, and got hold of All American Communications for 
£233 million two-and-a-half years later (Benson, 1994; Bateman, 1995). Of 
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particular interest to Dyke was a company acquired by All American three years 
before - Fremantle - a game show specialist that was exploiting the Goodson-
Todman formats internationally, and whose library included classics such as The 
Price is Right, Family Feud, To Tell the Truth, Concentration, Password, Card 
Sharks, and Blockbusters. Within just a few years Pearson’s network of 
production companies was more expansive than Endemol’s and the company was 
producing and licensing shows in about 30 territories (Benson 1994; Dyke, 
interview 2010).  
 
FROM THE RISE OF BRITAIN’S SUPER-INDIES… 
The international production model gained wider currency with the emergence of 
several large UK-based independent companies at the turn of the century. The 
independent TV production sector began to develop rapidly after the launch of 
Channel 4 in 1982: a broadcaster-publisher that commissioned 100 per cent of its 
output (Darlow, 2004; Potter, 2008). The sector received another boost when 
British Parliament voted the 1990 UK Broadcasting Act that required terrestrial 
broadcasters to commission at least 25 per cent of their programming (Doyle and 
Paterson, 2008). Although the vast majority of independent producers remained 
small in size, a few larger production groups began to emerge.  
Among them, the Chrysalis Group was the first to expand overseas when in 
1994 it took a 49 per cent stake in IDTV, a leading Dutch production company 
(Fuller, 1994b). Four years later it took control of South Pacific Pictures, a drama 
production company based in New Zealand (Broadcast, 1998). On the broadcaster 
side, Granada Media, one of the larger ITV companies, established its first 
 8 
production outpost in LA in 1997, Granada Entertainment USA, immediately 
followed by the purchase of an independent TV production company in Australia 
and, two years later, the creation of a German subsidiary, Granada Produktion für 
Film and Fernsehen (Deans, 1999). 
 
Creating a New Intellectual Property Regime 
However, the process of internationalization only began in earnest once the 
Communications Act, passed by British Parliament in 2003, had created strong 
incentives for UK-based companies to seek growth abroad. This act required the 
British media regulator, Ofcom, to establish a new Code of Practice that would 
modify the terms of trade between broadcasters and their suppliers, the production 
companies. Essentially, the code disaggregated the rights attached to a TV 
programme, enabling producers to keep those rights not purchased by 
broadcasters, including distribution rights (terrestrial, cable and satellite, online, 
mobile and international) and ancillary rights that are exploited through 
merchandising and licensing (Chalaby, 2010). This created a new intellectual 
property regime that ‘changed the fundamentals’ of the independent TV 
production sector in the UK (Dey, interview 2010). Production companies became 
owners of content because the intellectual property attached to TV shows, which 
used to be controlled by broadcasters, had become assets. Not only did these 
assets generate new income for production companies, they enabled them to 
attract investment either by floating the company or bringing in private investors. 
In all, this new intellectual property regime transformed small service companies 
that once lived a hand-to-mouth existence into fast-expanding businesses able to 
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exploit their own assets (Chalaby, 2010). 
 
The Consolidation of Britain’s Independent TV Production Sector 
Thus followed a round of consolidation in the independent sector, with small 
production companies coming together to attract investment and exploit their 
rights in a more efficient manner that cut out central costs. A group of about ten 
larger companies that came to be known as the ‘super-indies’ all adopted a similar 
structure: they assembled several production companies and developed one 
distribution arm specializing in international sales and distribution (Chalaby, 
2010). Whilst super-indies mostly acquired UK-based companies they also made 
some overseas acquisitions, enabling them to expand production capabilities into 
key markets. 
All3Media provides a perfect illustration. The company was formed in 2003 
following a management buy-in led by Steve Morrison of Chrysalis TV. 
All3Media had inherited IDTV and South Pacific Pictures then, in 2004, it 
purchased Lion TV, a UK-based production company with several offices and 
clients in the USA. Three years later it added MME Moviement, Germany’s 
largest production company, and in June 2008 it formed All3America after buying 
Zoo Productions, a US firm. As Morrison put it, the objective was to ‘scale up 
from being a largely UK-based company with international reach to becoming 
more of an international company’ (in Campbell, 2007). Today, All3Media 
incorporates 20 companies across six territories (Garvie, interview 2011; Kanter, 
2011: 5). 
Shine was founded by Elisabeth Murdoch in 2001. After several UK 
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acquisitions it began international expansion in 2007 with Reveille, a fashionable 
format company at the time that notably adapted TV hits Ugly Betty and The 
Office for US audiences. Two years later it had start-ups in Germany, France and 
Australia, before obtaining Metronome Film and Television, the largest 
production group of the Nordic region with 15 companies across the region. In 
2011 Shine established itself in Spain, bringing the group to 26 operating units 
across 10 markets (Mahon, interview 2010). 
By the end of the decade, even those super-indies without a large 
international footprint had developed a significant presence in the USA. Shed 
Media, RDF Media, Tinopolis, and DCD Media, opted for a US-focused strategy, 
opening up production facilities in America on the back of successful formats 
such as RDF’s Wife Swap, and Shed’s Supernanny, World’s Strictest Parents and 
Who Do You Think You Are? (Wood, 2010b). 
 
… TO THE BIRTH OF GLOBAL SUPER-GROUPS 
Over the past decade, the international production model has been adopted by a 
growing variety of TV companies. In particular, broadcasters have realized that 
controlling some of the intellectual property they air has become a strategic 
necessity.  
FremantleMedia became the content production division of RTL Group 
following the merger of Pearson Television and CLT-UFA in 2000. In effect, 
Pearson had sold its TV division to CLT-UFA but, still being a media company (it 
also owned the Financial Times), the RTL Group could not trade under the 
Pearson name. Thus, it renamed its content division after one of the businesses 
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Pearson had bought in the 1990s.  
ProSiebenSat.1 (another pan-European broadcaster based in Germany) 
followed suit in 2010, creating Red Arrow Entertainment in order to expand 
international production capabilities and produce content with international 
appeal. The group owns two companies that focus on formats, Munich-based 
Redseven Entertainment and Snowman Productions, headquartered in Stockholm 
with offices in Denmark and Norway. It acquired majority stakes in production 
houses in Belgium (Sultan Shushi, now also in the Netherlands), the USA (Fuse 
Entertainment, Kinetic), Britain (Mob Film, CPL Productions and Endor 
Productions), and Israel (Armoza Formats). Red Arrow has also signed several 
collaborative partnerships, most notably with Dick the Rijk, the creator of Deal or 
No Deal, and Omri Marcus in Israel.  
In the UK, the two leading terrestrial broadcasters have also developed their 
own networks. BBC Worldwide, the corporation’s commercial arm, built a 
network of seven production units, starting with Los Angeles in 2004, where it 
produces Dancing with the Stars for ABC. (The programme has since established 
itself as America’s premier entertainment show.) This was followed by local 
production units in Australia, Canada, India, France, Argentina and Germany 
(Garvie, interview 2010). Some of these units are joint ventures with local 
companies but the operations in LA, Paris and Mumbai are fully owned by BBC 
Worldwide (Paice, interview 2012).  
ITV Studios, (formerly ITV Productions) has progressively built on its 
Granada legacy (see above), adding production facilities in 2010 in Spain and 
France to the existing ones in Germany, Australia and the USA (East and West 
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Coast). It also acquired two companies in the late 2000s, 12 Yard Productions in 
London and Stockholm-based Silverback. The ITV Studios brand is now used 
everywhere (e.g. Silverback has become ITV Studios Nordic), with the exception 
of Granada Media Australia. Under Adam Crozier, ITV chief executive, ITV 
Studios has become a strategic priority and has developed into an £83 million 
business that produces more than 3,500 hours of content a year in the UK alone 
(Kanter, 2012: 22). 
Some of the firms with the largest footprint remain independent. Although 
Endemol has continued to expand under different ownership over the last ten 
years, one of the most active companies of recent times is Zodiak Media Group. It 
was brought together by an Italian publishing firm, De Agostini, which had taken 
over Italy’s largest independent producer, Magnolia, followed by Marathon in 
France and then Stockholm-based Zodiak Television. By the time of its purchase 
in 2008, Zodiak was present across the Nordic region, had four companies in the 
UK and production units in Belgium, Poland, Russia, and India. The group 
spanned 30 companies when it scooped one of the UK-based super-indies, RDF, 
in spring 2010. This considerably reinforced its presence in the UK and gave it 
access to the US market. Zodiak is headed by David Frank, RDF’s former chief 
executive, and today consists of 45 operating units spread across 17 territories 
(Jenkinson, 2011; Stuart, 2012).  
Finally, Paris-based Banijay Entertainment was also formed in recent years 
and is now in eight territories. Key acquisitions include Nordisk in Scandinavia – 
in itself a sizeable international group of companies - and Bunnim/Murray 
Productions, the LA-based company that produced The Real World in 1992. In the 
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UK, however, progress has stalled following a disagreement with Zig Zag 
Productions. 
 
The Hollywood Studios Join In 
Over the last few years, international production has become one of the TV 
industry’s dominant trends. First, countless formerly independent TV production 
companies in key territories are now part of the super-groups; second, these 
groups control a growing share of the scripted and unscripted entertainment 
bought by broadcasters worldwide; and third, the model is being adopted by the 
aristocracy of the cultural industries: the Hollywood studios.  
Until recently, the studios’s ethos has been to produce content with universal 
appeal and so the take up of the trend towards international TV production 
occurred later than for European firms. The benefits of local adaptation were also 
less obvious, at first sight at least, for scripted entertainment - the studios’s staple 
genre - than light entertainment or reality programming.  
However, in the mid-2000s the studios had begun to notice their TV series 
were getting less airtime in Europe.1 The EU Directive Television Without 
Frontiers had restricted to a maximum of 50 per cent the amount of non-European 
content a channel could broadcast.2 In addition, in Europe as elsewhere, the 
overwhelming majority of popular TV programmes are locally produced. These 
factors prompted the Hollywood studios to move into ‘local’ TV production – as 
                                                 
1 Jonathan Webdale, ‘Working Title returns to UK television’, C21 Formats Lab Weekly, 26 July 2005. 
2 The Audiovisual Media Services Directive, which replaced Television Without Frontiers in March 2010, includes 
the same provision. See http://ec.europa.eu/avpolicy/reg/avms/index_en.htm. 
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their executives refer to international production – with a mission to produce local 
versions of scripted series, and to develop local shows that could travel 
internationally when possible. 
Sony Pictures Entertainment was the first Hollywood studio to commit to 
multi-territory film production, having established local production units in Asia, 
Germany and the UK by the end of the 1990s (Hazelton, 2001). The studio’s TV 
division, Columbia TriStar International Television (CTIT) took a similar route 
and was producing local content in the same territories, plus Brazil. By the mid-
1990s CTIT was producing about 80 shows locally, including game shows such as 
The Pyramid Game and The Dating Game (ibid.). Today, Sony Pictures 
Television (as its new title) has 17 production companies (either jointly or solely 
owned) in 14 territories (Abrahams, interview 2011; Carugati, 2012). 
Others were to follow. NBC Universal International Television Production 
was created post-2005. With Headquarters in London the unit has since added one 
Australian and two British production companies, launched a joint venture with a 
previously-acquired film company (Working Title Television) and set up a new 
production unit (Chocolate Media).  
Warner Bros was to set up its own international production arm in 2009, 
based in London and headed by a former Endemol executive, Ronald Goes. His 
first purchase was Shed Media, one of the leading super-indies, for £100 million, 
in 2010. He followed this up with the acquisition of a majority stake in 
BlazHoffski, a Benelux format producer. The unit is part of Warner Bros. 
International Television division, whose president, Jeffrey Schlesinger, has 
ambitious plans: 
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We set up this division to get into local production. Our goal is to buy or 
build production companies in the top ten markets of the world just as 
Endemol and FremantleMedia have done, and be a local producer that will 
develop local ideas and produce them. We will also plan to take our shows 
that are formatable, like The Bachelor , and produce local versions of them (in 
World Screen, May 2011: 22). 
 
The fourth global media conglomerate to invest in international TV 
production was News Corp, which acquired Shine for an estimated £415 million 
in April 2011.  
Thus the march of the international TV production model has been 
inexorable, spreading from peripheral territories to Hollywood in the space of a 
few decades (Table 1). Today, in addition to British independents with offices in 
the USA and groups in an early development stage, there are about 14 companies 
with international TV production capabilities operating around the world (Table 
2). Despite differences among them in terms of scope, ethos, and type of 
ownership (independent v integrated producer-broadcaster), they can be referred 
to as the international TV production super-groups. The following section 
examines the reasons that prompted TV firms to internationalize their production 
capacity, and analyse the benefits associated with the strategy.  
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Table 1: March of the international TV production model, 1980s-2010s 
Timeline Adopters Characteristic players 
1980s Pioneers Grundy 
1990s First global TV production houses Endemol; Pearson TV 
2000s UK-based super-indies and some 
integrated producer-broadcasters 
Indies: All3Media; RDF Media; 
Shed Media; Shine 
Broadcasters: BBC Worldwide; ITV 
Studios; ProSiebenSat.1; RTL 
2010s Hollywood studios Sony Pictures Entertainment; NBC 
Universal; Warner Bros. 
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Table 2: International TV production super-groups, 2012 
Company Owner/type of 
company 
Headquarters Number of 
production 
companies/key 
brands 
International 
footprint (nb of 
territories) 
Leading proprietary intl. 
formats/programmes 
All3Media Independent London 20/idtv; Lion 
television; MME 
Moviement; 
Studio Lambert; 
Zoo Production 
6  The Fairy Jobmother; 
Undercover Boss; Skins; Cash 
Cab; Midsomer Murders 
Banijay Independent Paris 13/Air 
Productions; 
Bunim/Murray; 
Brainpool; 
Nordisk 
8 71 Degrees North; The 
Missionaries; My Big Fat 
Parents 
BBC Worldwide BBC/integrated London / 7 Dancing with the Stars; Doctor 
Who; The Great Bake Off; 
Torchwood; Top Gear 
Endemol Independent Amsterdam 80 31  Big Brother; Deal or No Deal; 
The Money Drop; Wipeout 
Eyeworks Independent Amsterdam / 17 Test The Nation; Who Wants To 
Marry My Son?  
FremantleMedia RTL/integrated London 25/Fremantle; 
Grundy; UFA 
22 Idols; Hole in the Wall; 
Neighbours; Take Me Out 
ITV Studios ITV/integrated London 3/12 Yard; 
Silverback 
7 Come Dine with Me; Dancing on 
Ice; Four Weddings; I’m a 
Celebrity… Get Me Out of Here 
NBC Universal 
Intl. TV 
Production 
NBC Universal/ 
integrated 
London 5/Carnival Films; 
Monkey Kingdom 
3 (Australia; 
UK; USA) 
Agatha Christie’s Poirot; 
Downton Abbey; Minute To Win 
It; The Real Housewives Of… 
Red Arrow 
Entertainment 
ProSiebenSat.1/ 
integrated 
Munich 6/Armoza; CPL 
Productions; 
Endor 
Productions; Fuse 
Entertainment; 
Kinetic; Mob 
Film 
9 My Man Can; Still Standing; We 
Believe in You; You Deserve It 
Shine Group News 
Corp/integrated 
London 26 10 The Biggest Loser; MasterChef; 
Merlin; One Born Every Minute 
Strix Modern Times 
Group/integrated 
Stockholm / 4 Class Of ...; The Farm; The Bar 
Sony Television 
Production Intl. 
Sony Pictures 
Television 
London 17/2waytraffic 14 Who Wants to Be a Millionaire? ; 
Dragon’s Den; Everybody Loves 
Raymond; The Dr. Oz Show 
Warner Bros. Intl. 
TV Distribution 
Time 
Warner/integrated 
London 2/Shed Media; 
BlazHoffski 
4 (Belgium; 
Netherlands; 
UK; USA) 
Brat Camp; Supernanny; The 
World’s Strictest Parents; Who 
Do You Think You Are?  
Zodiak Media 
Group 
independent London 45/ 
Magnolia; 
Marathon; RDF; 
Zodiak TV 
17 Being Human; Don’t Forget the 
Lyrics; Fort Boyard; The 
Inbetweeners;  Secret 
Millionaire; Wallander; Wife 
Swap 
 
 
 18 
 
 
TV PRODUCTION IN THE AGE OF DEEP GLOBALIZATION 
The overarching factor behind internationalization is globalization. ‘Globalization, 
Lampel and Shamsie write, poses a fundamental challenge to what constitutes 
competitive advantage in the cultural industries’ (Lampel and Shamsie, 2003: 
278). For a production company, competitive advantage equates access to the 
international programming market and the ability to develop, exploit and control 
intellectual property (IP) across borders. The international programming market 
is born out of the thousands of terrestrial, cable and satellite channels that 
broadcast today worldwide. In Europe alone, the number of TV channels 
comfortably is currently approaching 9,000, and programming spends reached 
£3.3 billion in 2009.3 
In the past, as noted above, European broadcasters purchased almost 
exclusively finished programmes, either films or TV series from Hollywood or 
documentaries from European counterparts. The format revolution that occurred 
in the late 1990s deepened media globalization (Bazalgette, 2005; Chalaby, 2011). 
In addition to completed programmes, intangible elements such as concepts for 
TV shows, branding elements and production guidelines began to cross borders. 
This intensified the international exchanges and transfrontier connections in the 
TV industry, increasing the interpenetration and interconnectedness of national 
broadcasting systems. 
                                                 
3 The European Audiovisual Observatory’s MAVISE database counted 8,918 TV channels in May 2012. See 
http://mavise.obs.coe.int/. 
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Ever since broadcasters have understood the benefits of airing local versions 
of global concepts, the format trade has gone from strength to strength. The 
number of formats produced worldwide, as the number of companies involved in 
the trade, has swelled from a handful to hundreds. In 2008, it was estimated that 
‘as much as 20 per cent of the peak time schedules […] of leading broadcast 
networks in major European territories is accounted for by local versions of 
formats’ (Oliver and Ohlbaum, 2009: 12). The format business is a thriving trade 
that was recently valued at €3.1 billion per year by FRAPA, the international 
format industry association dedicated to their protection (FRAPA, 2009: 17).  
Fostering the cross-border flows of ideas and concepts, the format revolution 
has thus created a globalized market for intellectual property that presents 
opportunities and challenges for content creators and producers. As formats travel 
further and faster than ever, production companies must develop the capabilities 
to exploit and control their IP across borders. As a piece of IP can attract interest 
from around the globe, the international is no longer a foreign territory (the export 
model) but now lies at the heart of the business model of any leading production 
company. Within the context of a globalized IP market, production companies 
derive many benefits from internationalization. 
 
The Benefits of Scale 
International expansion pushes up scale, which itself brings with several 
advantages. First, scale is necessary to generate interest from investors. For years, 
UK-based production companies had tried wooing the City but without much 
success. For instance, RDF - listed on the LSE’s Alternative Investment Market 
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from 2005 with a valuation of up to £100 million - did not have enough liquidity 
‘to interest analysts’ and become a ‘regularly traded stock’ (Curtis, 2010: 23; see 
also Dennis, 2005). David Frank, Zodiak Media Group’s chief executive, 
estimates that a production group needs to reach £1billion annual turnover and (in 
the UK) join the FTSE 250 in order to make it ‘worth analysts spending time to 
understand our overall strategy’ (in Curtis, 2010: 23). A company with 
international capacity becomes even more attractive to the City by increasing the 
predictability of cashflow. Concentration in a single market leaves the company 
overexposed to currency fluctuation and the ebb and flow of the local advertising 
market, whereas international companies can collaterize earnings across multiple 
territories. 
Size is also crucial in distribution, which is inherently a ‘scale business’ 
(Graham, interview 2010). A large production company will not only be able to 
put together a diversified catalogue spanning all key genres but will be able to add 
third party properties to its books. As with supermarkets, choice is necessary in 
order to sustain interest from customers. A large distributor can also get involved 
in deficit financing4 and can negotiate better terms with large broadcasters (ibid; 
Dey, interview 2010). 
Scale brings two further benefits in terms of development. Large companies 
can create development funds to push formats internationally. For instance, once 
Pointless had become an established game show on BBC2, Endemol funded the 
pilot for France Télévisions using the old BBC set (Rosser, 2011). International 
                                                 
4 When a broadcaster only partly finances a project – hence the deficit – a distributor can decide to provide some 
funding in exchange of rights.  
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scale also brings with it greater flexibility in format development. Some paper 
formats, never taken up in their country of origin, have gone on to do well in other 
markets. FremantleMedia has turned Take Me Out into a global success: created 
by its French subsidiary and initially rejected by local broadcasters, the format 
found success in Asia. Some formats even return to territories where they had 
once failed following good ratings elsewhere. Quite famously, ABC had 
originally overlooked Endemol’s Deal Or No Deal after it piloted poorly for the 
US network, but were later impressed by European ratings. The show then 
became a huge hit in the UK and on the basis of the tapes of this particular 
version, it was relaunched in the USA and turned into an enduring success for 
NBC (Hincks, interview 2010).  
 
Intellectual Property (IP) Generation, Exploitation and Protection 
By industry consensus, television is a hit-driven business involving a high level of 
unpredictability (Picard 2005: 66). A great international format, aside from 
defining a career, can change the fortunes of a company. Endemol grew on the 
back of Big Brother, as did RDF with Wife Swap, Shed with Supernanny and 
FremantleMedia with Idols. BBC Worldwide developed its international 
production network on the back of Dancing with the Stars. But hits are few and 
far between and great ideas formidably scarce. Size alone cannot guarantee super-
groups the ‘next big thing’: they need to make themselves bigger than the sum of 
their parts.  
First, all groups ensure that ideas, information and expertise flow across 
creative teams, what Alex Mahon, Shine’s group president, calls ‘connecting 
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creativity’ (Mahon, interview 2010). Ideas can flow in different fashions but 
groups avoid excessive centralization and a few have recently dispensed with the 
role of global creative officer, including Endemol and Zodiak. It is now 
understood that a global hit cannot be manufactured in a social vacuum (i.e. for an 
imaginary global market) but always has a local origin and – at first – a local 
destination. Tim Hincks, Endemol UK’s chief executive, explains: ‘ideas are 
incredibly local, even individual’ and thus ‘you can’t really run Endemol’s ideas 
from the centre, you can’t really run a creative organization centrally’ (Hincks, 
interview 2010).  
Hence the challenge is to make the local global – identifying local formats 
that have the potential to go around the world – and then make the global local by 
assessing the degree of adaptation a format needs in a specific market. Most 
super-groups structure the creative flow of ideas according to these imperatives. 
Small cross-border teams identify the best ideas and allocate funds once they 
decide to champion them. All groups also ensure that conversations take place 
among local teams so they can learn from each other, share ideas and contrast 
different approaches. For instance, Endemol’s British and American creative 
teams regularly meet for brainstorming sessions. Alex Mahon prizes Shine’s 
‘international culture’ and the group has a dedicated team to ensure an on-going 
dialog among its creatives. The team head, Ben Hall, is attempting to forge a 
diversified ‘creative pallet’ that is cosmopolitan in character, distinguishing ideas 
that are merely parochial from those that may gain international resonance (Hall, 
interview 2010). 
Making IP travel along the local-global-local route is the way super-groups 
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transform local shows into super-formats. It is how Endemol turned Das 
Hairdresser into The Salon and Now or Neverland into Fear Factor , how Shine 
transformed Masterchef and BBC Worldwide Dancing With the Stars. The latter 
was not selling abroad: who else but the Brits would be interested in ballroom 
dancing? But an American version helped to convince broadcasters that the show 
could be made locally relevant. It has since become the world’s most successful 
reality TV format. Approximately 40 international versions are currently 
produced, and 176 seasons have aired so far around the world (Jarvis, interview 
2010; Whittock 2011). In June 2011 BBC Worldwide organized a summit in 
London for 16 production teams in order to share expertise about the show and to 
‘create a global narrative around [the] format’ (ibid.). 
The process of consolidation in the production industry and the formation of 
super-groups make the strategy of in-house IP generation doubly important. Since 
all the production groups are equally intent on hanging on to their IP, the market 
for formats has dried up and it has become virtually impossible to acquire 
interesting properties at a reasonable price. This makes IP generation – and more 
fundamentally creativity – essential to the commercial well-being of these groups 
and places it at the very core of their business model.  
It thus raises the issue as to whether the control of creative resources – as 
opposed to mere access – is still necessary for companies to gain a competitive 
edge. A view has developed, validated by the commercial strategies of Hollywood 
studios and game publishers, that ‘access to talent’ has become more 
advantageous than ‘control of talent’ (Lampel and Shamsie, 2006: 279; see also 
Lampel and Shamsie, 2003). Likewise, it would not make financial sense for 
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production companies to retain well-known presenters and directors on long-term 
contracts. However, the scarcity of hit ideas and limited availability of IP means 
that control over some creative talent (such as programme makers) and resources 
remain a competitive advantage. Kees Abrahams, president of international 
production at Sony Pictures Television, is emphatic: ‘the biggest risk for every 
company in our business is to lose their key talents, but the biggest opportunity is 
to attract the right talent’ (Abrahams, interview 2011). 
The scarcity of hits also dictates that the maximum value must be extracted 
from any piece of IP. The primary reason that prompted the pioneers to develop 
their international production capabilities was to boost revenue from their formats. 
Under the old model, format licensing, the IP owner received only a licence fee 
from the show’s local producer, usually falling somewhere between 7 and 8 per 
cent of total production costs per episode (EBU 2005: 33). With the exception of a 
few global brands for which production costs can be exorbitant, daytime quiz 
shows and factual entertainment programmes that require no studio can be 
produced very cheaply. Indeed, low production costs sometimes constitute the 
unique selling point of these formats. Thus their licence fee would barely cover 
distribution costs, and a format company would be unable to rely on this income 
alone.5 
Production groups have internationalized because there is more value in 
format production than licensing. Gary Carter, FremantleMedia’s chief operating 
officer, explains it clearly: ‘there is very little point if you want to be big to just be 
                                                 
5 The closure of Distraction Formats in 2009, a pioneering Montreal-based formats distribution company founded in 
1997 by Michel Rodrigue, provides a case in point. 
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in the intellectual property business; you have to be in the production business. 
And as soon as you got into the production business, intellectual property [and] 
formats become important because they allow you to expand into a territory to 
gain production’ (Carter, interview 2008). 
In addition to the distribution fee, the revenues that can flow into the group 
include a share of profits, which can be as high as 40 percent of the show’s total 
budget in certain territories (ibid.). Alternatively, producers can receive a 
production fee and, depending on the strength of the format and the outcome of 
negotiations, a ratings bonus and, where applicable, a share of the voting income.  
Thus, international production enables companies to capture the value of a 
format by retaining a longer stay in its value chain. This advantage alone justifies 
the risk and overheads involved in the running of an international production 
network. 
Furthermore, international producers are more likely to retain more control 
over more IP rights. During negotiations, broadcasters inevitably try to hold on to 
as many rights as possible, including a share of distribution (terrestrial, cable and 
satellite, video on demand, international, etc.) and ancillary rights (Chalaby 2010). 
The latter are connected to online, mobile and iPad applications, games (all 
platforms), CDs, DVDs, magazines and books, down to clothing lines (e.g. 
Dancing with the Stars), kitchen accessories (e.g. MasterChef) and live events.6 
When a format is produced under licence, broadcasters are likely to obtain control 
                                                 
6 Live events have become particularly lucrative among these brand extensions and the rapidly growing list includes 
The American Idol Experience, Dancing with the Stars The Tour, the X Factor Live Tour, MasterChef Live, the Top 
Gear Live Show, Grand Design Live, and The Price is Right Live. 
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over these rights, and therefore it is they who will exploit these rights locally. 
Although the outcome of negotiations always depends on the clout of the 
respective parties and strength of the formats, a likely result is that the IP owner 
will be forced to accept a net participation in the exploitation of these rights. Since 
the buyer is entitled to deduct all expenses before passing on its share of the 
profits to the IP owner, there is often not much left for the latter (EBU 2005: 36-
8).  
International producers have various responses to demands for rights. Like 
any other company they can invest in a pilot, enabling them to negotiate from a 
stronger position than with a paper format. They can also first produce the show in 
a country where their rights position is solid, such as the UK, before selling the 
show in territories such as the USA, where broadcasters are in a strong position, 
either because of their commercial clout or due to legislation. International 
producers can also claim that the rights of a particular show are unavailable 
because held by a foreign subsidiary who wishes to retain them all. They can then 
insist on producing or co-producing the show. Not only will their share of profits 
be considerably higher (even though they may have to share some of the proceeds 
with the broadcaster) but they can protect their brand by overseeing the 
commercial exploitation of these rights. Super-groups have divisions (e.g. 
Endemol Worldwide Distribution, Fremantle Enterprises, Zodiak Rights) whose 
role is to realize the full value of assets by ensuring that all revenue streams are 
exploited. 
International production capabilities are also valuable for quality control 
purposes. A format keeps its value only when buyers are certain that it can be a 
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ratings winner. One single poor adaptation can instill doubts in buyers’ minds and 
irremediably damage an erstwhile valuable franchise. Today, the transfer of 
expertise between seller and buyer is well established and the overall format 
package includes computer graphics, branding and the production bible that 
contains all necessary information about run-throughs, budgets, scripts, set 
designs, casting procedures, host profile, the selection of contestants, and every 
other possible aspect associated with the show’s production. Consultant producers 
will also fly in and advise the local teams at various stages of the production 
process (EBU 2005; Moran 2006). Nonetheless, an IP owner takes a risk each 
time it selects a local producer. The latter may lack experience in the genre, be 
unfamiliar with certain aspects of the format, or be more concerned about its 
profit margins than the franchise itself.  
Production companies mitigate this risk by designating partners in key 
territories with whom they collaborate regularly. Ken Starkey and colleagues call 
this sort of arrangement ‘latent organizations … that bind together configurations 
of key actors in ongoing relationships that become active/manifest as and when 
new projects demand’ and that are based on ‘knowledge and trust’ among partners 
(Starkey et al., 2000: 299, 303). But this risk is reduced further by keeping a 
format within the group. The teams know each other well and can remain in touch 
throughout the production process, enabling a smoother transfer of expertise, 
leading to a good quality execution. Commercially sensitive information is more 
willingly shared and, if at first the show does not perform as well as expected, 
issues can be explored without risk of litigation. 
A network of production companies can also prevent the over-exploitation 
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of a format. In the early 2000s, two British shows, Who Wants to be a 
Millionaire?  and The Weakest Link, burnt out quickly because the IP owners, 
Celador and the BBC respectively, had relinquished too much control to the 
American network which overused them. In the case of The Weakest Link it taught 
the BBC a valuable lesson about IP control, and it is partly what spurred BBC 
Worldwide to turn itself into a global format producer (Jarvis, interview 2010).  
Furthermore, global production capabilities are the best line of defense 
against IP theft. Once a format has been proven successful the chances are that 
copycat shows will appear, but taking competitors to court remains a costly and 
unpredictable business. In the unscripted genres, the absence of a script and 
characters make formats difficult to protect, despite progress and encouraging 
signs (FRAPA 2011). Research shows that only one court case out of two is 
successful (Singh 2010). In addition, court cases take a very long time to settle 
and a case that is won well after the sell-by-date of a show is of no value. Thus the 
best line of defense is commercial, and an international production network 
enables a company to be ‘first to market’ by rolling out formats very quickly 
across borders and thereby preempting the appearance of copies (e.g. Mahon, 
interview 2010). In addition, broadcasters think twice before burning bridges with 
companies like Sony or Fremantle by ripping off their formats, knowing that the 
latter will hand over their next blockbuster to the competition (Abrahams, 
interview 2011). 
 
From Format to Global Franchise: Managing an Expanded Value Chain 
A franchise can be defined as an ensemble of stories and characters that are 
 29 
developed across territories, media platforms, consumer products and 
generations (over time).7The first franchises were developed by the Hollywood 
studios, and the Walt Disney Company has undoubtedly become the master of the 
trade (e.g. Cars, High School Musical, Pirates of the Caribbean). Today, super-
groups strive to transform their best-performing formats into global franchises.  
Who Wants to Be a Millionaire? was the first TV show to follow this route. 
From the onset, Paul Smith intended to create a global brand with trademarked 
attributes and very tightly defined production rules and licensing agreements 
(Smith, interview 2009). Since its launch Millionaire has been adapted in more 
than 100 territories and the merchandising has been expanded to 140 product 
lines, at one stage representing 40 per cent of the format revenue. The television 
show was simply considered to be a shop window for all the merchandising 
behind it (Spencer, interview 2008; see also Chalaby 2011). Other global 
franchises created by international TV producers include Big Brother, Dancing 
With the Stars, Got Talent, Idols, Masterchef, Survivor and The X Factor .  
Such franchises are invaluable IP assets with a value chain that travels along 
two axes. The first is geographical (or horizontal), as these properties cross 
borders, and the second is vertical, as they can be monetized across a variety of 
platforms and products, including video games and live events. As seen in the 
previous section, an international production network facilitates the exploitation 
of IP assets and thus offers a company more control of both axes of the value 
                                                 
7 Based on Walt Disney’s definition of franchises as “stories and characters that can be leveraged 
across many of our businesses, on many technological platforms, in many territories, and over long 
periods of time.” (The Walt Disney Company 2009: 6). 
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chain. Today, a company without such a network but with an exceptionally strong 
format would need the assistance of a super-group to turn it into a global 
franchise. Syco Television for instance, has enlisted the help of FremantleMedia 
for the international and vertical exploitation of its two key properties, Got Talent 
and The X Factor. 
 
CONCLUSION: TV PRODUCTION IN THE AGE OF DEEP 
GLOBALIZATION 
The international production model was pioneered by firms from countries located 
at the periphery of the global TV trade, and for a long time it was confined to a 
genre that is considered minor and unworthy: game shows. The model ceased to 
be marginal when it was adopted by the British super-indies and some 
broadcasters at the turn of the century, and it has obtained its lettres de noblesse in 
recent years as it has been embraced by the conglomerates that control Hollywood 
studios.  
The turning point in the model’s history has been the deepening of media 
globalization brought about by the format revolution. This revolution has opened 
up a market for intellectual property and intangibles such as programming 
concepts and branding elements. This market is global in scope in the sense that a 
format can end up anywhere in the world and will also contend with the world’s 
best formats when a broadcaster opens up a slot to competition. This new market 
has expanded geographical and vertical value chain of a piece of IP, and thus the 
companies that have adapted their business strategy to the new reality are those 
that dominate the industry today.  
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The emergence of global TV production super-groups raises the issue of 
industry concentration and its cultural impact. Whilst the emergence of a 
globalized IP market has presented a few firms with a unique opportunity, it can 
be argued that the cost of expanding and maintaining an international production 
network has raised the barriers of entry to the industry. According to Thomas Dey, 
a corporate banker who specializes in the TV production sector, ‘the end game is 
the global consolidation of the production sector into five $1bn businesses – 
which will ultimately be owned by the studios’ (in Wood, 2010a: 25).  
However, as an IP industry, creativity and intangibles remain more important 
than industrial processes and capabilities. For all their might, the super-groups 
have not found the magic formula for the perpetual generation of hits, leaving 
room for talented individuals and small companies to make an impact. Currently, 
some UK-based super-indies are experiencing a flight of talented individuals who 
have chosen to return to their ‘programme-making roots’ (Neilan, 2011: 32), 
demonstrating that the industry’s future remains difficult to predict.  
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